

Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence **Development Plans and Assistance**

Background Paper

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Development Plans and Assistance

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Executive Summary

Armed violence reduction and prevention¹ (AVR) is driven by the humanitarian and development imperative to accelerate global development by reducing the global burden of armed violence. The AVR approach responds to contemporary challenges of violence by addressing the risk factors for crime, interpersonal violence and conflict.

Local and national governments experience armed violence most directly and have pioneered a range of preventive responses, often with the support of local communities. The donor community and UN system are also increasingly aware of the potential of targeted preventive measures. They have begun to adapt their strategies and instruments to better assist countries in their struggle to prevent and reduce all forms of violence. This report provides an overview of some of the emerging lessons learned about how AVR priorities can be integrated into local, national and donor development plans and assistance strategies.

Emerging lessons learned:

- **Measuring and monitoring armed violence**

Adequate diagnostics have proved essential for governments to understand the scale and nature of the problem, and to successfully integrate AVR objectives into development planning. Identifying local risk factors for violence can be achieved by supporting data collection in hospitals, universities, police departments and crime observatories. In addition, donors can support regular surveys or assessments to inform and evaluate AVR programming, and to ensure that all programming in high-violence areas is AVR-sensitive and ‘does no harm’. This can also support local and national governments in their efforts to tailor development plans to better respond to the local challenges of violence and to monitor impact.

- **Multisectoral and ‘whole-of-government’ approaches**

A multisectoral approach is required to tackle the risk factors of armed violence. The approach should bolster the work of security and justice services with community and urban security programmes, and aim to adapt more mainstream development efforts to better address armed violence risk factors. Integrating AVR into development planning processes is crucial to guide a multisectoral approach. Similarly, multisectoral AVR programming requires more cross-government work in donor countries, greater use of pooled funds and better integration of AVR priorities in established budget lines. Donors need to do better at working at the regional, municipal and local level, including with informal service delivery stakeholders on the ground.

- **Interdependencies between local, national and transnational action**

AVR requires a multilevel response because armed violence is both localized and globalized and local, national and international action is interdependent. Integrating AVR into local and national development plans helps create an enabling environment for targeted AVR programming. This can also mobilize support for AVR priorities from governments, civil society, the private sector and external donors. Donors can help countries tackle armed violence risk factors by channelling their support to local, municipal, and national levels, and by helping address transnational risk factors such as drug trafficking, cross-border crime, and conflict over environmental issues.

- **Local and national leadership and capacity**

Sustained and effective political leadership often builds on constructive relationships with NGOs, communities and the private sector, and is important for promoting AVR across government and for driving through policies and reforms. Local and national governments need adequate institutional capacity so they can plan and apply appropriate and effective responses to armed violence. In contexts of weak and fragile governance, capacity development is a prerequisite to successful AVR, and donors need to support institutional capacity building, including through AVR programming.

In short, armed violence is a local, national and global security and development challenge that can best be addressed collectively through strong partnerships between societal and state stakeholders. However, more needs to be done to identify local armed violence risk factors, determine AVR opportunities, and to orient development plans to address them.

¹ Armed violence consists of ‘the intentional, threatened or actual use of arms to inflict death or injury’, United Nations, *Promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence*, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, A/64/228, 2009.

1. Introduction

Armed violence reduction and prevention² (AVR) is driven by the humanitarian and development imperative to accelerate global development by reducing the global burden of armed violence. AVR is based on an awareness of the changing nature and complex dynamics of violence in the 21st century. The large-scale civil wars that prevailed until the late 1990s are in decline. Yet, levels of social and criminal violence are increasing and there are strong connections between different forms of violence. Interpersonal violence often increases after large-scale politically motivated violence ends (for example in El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia and Somalia). Conversely, countries with high levels of interpersonal violence have shown tendencies toward sporadic large-scale instability, for example Kenya (ethnic violence), and South Africa (urban riots).

The distribution of violence is also changing. High rates of violence are common in urban centres and slums in Latin America, Africa and Asia, as well as in peripheral, marginal and historically neglected regions. These include border regions and other under-governed spaces that are vulnerable to control by criminal or militant groups, (for example in northern Colombia, southern Lebanon and much of Somalia). Most of this violence is not linked to inter-State wars, but it is an international phenomenon. Clashes between pastoralist or criminal groups often lead to violence spreading across borders, while transnational organized crime can also have an impact on local dynamics of violence.

Responding to these challenges requires a multisectoral approach that combines developmental and preventive programming with more effective law enforcement and political efforts. Traditional enforcement responses to violence have proved expensive and, even if well resourced, are ill equipped to address the causes. They can therefore be usefully boosted by preventive efforts to address risk factors. Integrating AVR into both local and national development planning processes is an important step in achieving its objectives, and provides a basis for sustained and coordinated ‘whole-of-government’ responses. At the same time, donors can play an important role in supporting local and national efforts to reduce armed violence and in tackling external risk factors at regional and global levels. This briefing aims to provide an overview of some of this valuable experience, showing how local, national and development stakeholders are taking on the AVR challenge.

Section two considers experience in incorporating AVR into local and national development planning processes, and provides examples of how robust preventive programming can accompany law enforcement. It demonstrates the interdependence between different levels of action, showing why armed violence must be tackled at both local and national levels through multisectoral approaches.

Section three views the AVR challenge from the donor perspective. It describes the AVR approach and shows how donors have begun to integrate AVR priorities into their work by adapting their assessments, funding instruments and programming.

² Armed violence consists of ‘the intentional, threatened or actual use of arms to inflict death or injury’, United Nations, *Promoting development through the reduction and prevention of armed violence*, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, A/64/228, 2009.

2. Integrating AVR into national and local development plans

This section reviews approaches and experience in incorporating AVR into local and national development plans.³ It addresses: comprehensive local approaches to rural and urban AVR and planning processes; the importance of linkages between national and local levels; and efforts to integrate AVR into national development plans.

2.1 Overview of existing strategies and partnerships at local and municipal levels

Reducing armed violence requires bottom-up and locally led approaches that support community capacities, as well as the effectiveness and resilience of the state. Indeed, it is at the local level – where armed violence is experienced directly and pressure for a response is greatest – that some of the most active and promising AVR initiatives and partnerships have been developed. Municipal and local governments have played a critical role by creating an enabling environment and directing resources to maintain their success. Meanwhile, a trend towards decentralization of government functions and resources in certain regions of the world, notably Latin America and Africa, has increased the imperative for action at this level.

2.1.1 Comprehensive local approaches and planning processes

The most comprehensive government-led responses to armed violence have emerged in severely affected (often urban) areas in South America and Central America. Several local and municipal governments have played a critical role (through loan support from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)) in reducing armed violence in concert with local communities and a range of other stakeholders from the private and NGO sectors. Interventions have been coordinated, planned and implemented across a variety of policy areas to address multiple risk factors through a preventive and developmental approach combining direct and indirect programming approaches.⁴

Enhanced law enforcement, for example via community-based policing, has been combined with preventative activities designed and implemented with the involvement of communities, NGOs and the private sector (see box 1).

³ A forthcoming AVR programme mapping exercise commissioned by the OECD will provide a more comprehensive examination of AVR programming experience in six focus countries.

⁴ Indirect AVR programming refers to programmes that do not target AVR as their primary objective. Rather, their main target will be other development objectives such as reducing poverty. However, they will see opportunities to reduce risks of violence and enhance protective factors. Direct programming seeks to explicitly prevent and/or reduce armed violence, and to enhance real and perceived security.

What worked in Bogota?

In the 1993-2002 period, homicide rates in Bogotá plunged from 80 to 28 homicides per 100,000 people; accidents were reduced by half, and the police increased capture rates by 400 percent without an increase in the size of the police force. Bogotá's success with violence reduction illustrates the importance of political commitment sustained across three different administrations, and of the allocation of sufficient resources to combat crime and violence. Data on strategies used shows that reductions in violence were achieved by:

- Campaigns to promote citizen disarmament and control of alcohol consumption. Effective information systems provided detailed information on violent crime events. 'Plan Desarme' was then created to control the circulation of firearms. For instance, in 2001, around 6,500 firearms were voluntarily returned to the police as a result of the Plan. In addition, with the implementation of 'Ley Zanahoria', alcohol sales ended at 3am on weekends to reduce the rates of violent crimes. Firearm and alcohol control had a significant effect in violence reduction.
- Actions to recuperate decayed urban spaces. Two of the most violent areas in Bogotá – Avenida Caracas and the Cartucho zone – underwent urban and transport infrastructure renewal. As a result, levels of crime and violence declined substantially in both areas. In Avenida Caracas, homicides dropped by 60 percent from 1999 to 2003. At the same time, in the Cartucho zone, robbery went down by 70 percent between 2000 and 2003.
- Frentes de seguridad. Neighbourhood crime-monitoring committees encourage collaborative relationships between community police officers and local residents. This has reversed the levels of mistrust between police and the community and there has been an increase in crime prevention efforts.
- Family police stations. Evaluation data shows that protective measures available through these police stations established to control family violence were more effective than conciliation measures in reducing physical violence against women in the family.
- Professionalization of the police. Police reform and modernization were accomplished through a plan emphasizing results-based performance. An epidemiological approach was introduced to monitor crime and violence data, which bolstered the design of crime prevention actions. Training in preventive policing has been widely accepted by citizens as an efficient alternative to reduce violence and improve coexistence.

Source: Lorente and Rivas, 2004. Cit. IDB 2005

Even in fragile or transition situations where institutions and governments are weaker, community driven area-based development activities designed to reduce violence and insecurity are playing a valuable role in promoting a comprehensive approach to AVR. These activities are sometimes described as community security initiatives, citizen security plans or community-based recovery programmes and help communities to address their own needs. They aim to provide physical protection and to target the wider political and economic drivers of violence, such as social exclusion. They support popular participation in local political/policy processes to enhance local government and criminal justice system capacity to engage in developing and implementing community security activities (see Box 3).⁵

⁵ UNDP, 'Community Security and Social Cohesion, Towards a UNDP Approach', Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2005, p. 10.

Integrating AVR priorities into local government plans and policy frameworks is critical to developing and sustaining these comprehensive local approaches to AVR. Experience suggests that a number of factors support this process:

- **Institutional structures**

In some contexts, local coordination mechanisms, new local government bodies or lead departments have been established to facilitate the inclusion of AVR objectives across local government structures and planning processes. For example, in Bogota, Colombia, the local government's commitment to develop AVR and citizen security policies and programmes resulted in the creation of an Office for Citizen Security and the allocation of financial resources; both of these were maintained through three administrations.⁶

- **Diagnostic processes**

Information systems, data collection, assessments and surveys help governments to develop appropriate plans, understand AVR risk factors and provide a baseline for monitoring progress. In a number of settings, crime observatories have been created to enhance diagnostic capacity (see Box 2). They establish a system of vigilance to compile, analyse and systematically interpret data from a range of information sources, including the health and criminal justice systems (police, public health, forensics, etc.).

Participatory assessment tools and methodologies help enable communities to highlight the main threat to their security and to shape development plans. This can be a highly effective way to identify relevant entry points for AVR activities, generate local ownership, and enhance local capacity for long-term trend monitoring, social mobilization and advocacy.⁷

BOX 2

Establishing a crime observatory in Honduras

The Observatory of Violence in Honduras was launched in 2006 as a joint initiative of the Honduran Government, the Institute for Peace, Democracy and Security at the Autonomous National University of Honduras, UNDP and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. The Honduran State Secretary on Security, Health and Education, the Public Prosecutor, and the National Institute for Women are the Observatory's national partners.

The Observatory works with the school hospital, the head of criminal investigation and the head of preventive police to gather information and build capacity for data collection and management. Information is cross-referenced from police, hospital, university and media data to establish reliable statistics. The partner institutions meet weekly to analyse the findings, and a regular bulletin is published with key data to help influence public policy at a local and national level. The Observatory's information has helped challenge some incorrect assumptions about crime. For example, the police believed that street gangs were responsible for most of the killings, but the new data showed that organized narcotics traffickers were mainly responsible.

Source: UNDP 2009⁸

6 Buvinic, M, Alda, E and Lamas, J, 'Emphasizing Prevention in Citizen Security, The Inter-American Development Bank's Contribution to Reducing Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean', IADB, Washington, D.C., 2005, p. 11.

7 OECD, 'Conflict and Fragility: Armed Violence Reduction, Enabling Development', OECD, 2009, p. 68.

8 'Observatorio de la Violencia': accessed at: http://www.undp.un.hn/Gob_Observatorio_violencia_Honduras.htm.

- **Political will and adequate capacity**

Sustained political commitment and leadership, for example by local government officials, coupled with adequate institutional capacity and resources, are required to create and support plans. If there is no long-term political commitment, plans that emphasize short-term impact through low cost interventions (such as restricting alcohol sales) can be effective in generating support.⁹ In very fragmented/fragile governance contexts, it has been necessary to implement a step-by-step process to reinforce state capacity, and to create an enabling government policy and planning environment for local community security activities. Pilot initiatives and engaging stakeholders in a committee-type structure have been used as mechanisms for capacity building. They have built support and influenced wider policy processes and development plans (see Box 3).

BOX 3

Violence reduction in pastoralist communities in Kenya

Armed violence and insecurity is particularly visible in the pastoral communities of north-eastern and north-western Kenya. A history of tensions, fierce competition for scarce resources, widespread availability and ownership of firearms, low capacity of rule of law institutions, and general socioeconomic misery have produced a fragile environment that is highly conducive to armed violence.

In 2004, with support from UNDP, the Kenyan government piloted a project to explore ways to address these issues in Garissa District. The project has expanded into a three-year programme. It used existing institutional and management structures such as district peace committees and the district security and intelligence committee, to gradually build up the capacity of both the local administration and communities to address proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and local security issues. At the same time, it also addressed development priorities such as livelihood support and access to water resources.

This approach to AVR is now being replicated in other districts and is reflected in the Kenya National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management.

Source: UNDP 2006

- **Externally supported programmes**

Local government leadership is essential for AVR to succeed, but externally supported initiatives and programmes can usefully reinforce local capacities and coordination mechanisms, and support integrating AVR objectives into local development and security plans (see Box 4).

⁹ Ibid, p. 20.

UN work with local governance structures in Croatia, Guatemala, Haiti and Liberia

In **Croatia**, the UNDP programme worked with local crime prevention councils that had been established as part of the national community policing plan. These councils were chaired by a mayor and included representatives from municipal government, police, judiciary, schools, health and welfare institutions and civil society.

In **Guatemala**, UNDP worked with the local government to support establishing a municipal citizen security commission in Santa Lucia. A survey was carried out of the main threats to citizen security, and a plan was developed that included action to ban people from carrying guns in bars, control alcohol sales, improve street lighting, introduce community-based policing, reclaim public spaces, address vagrancy and reduce violence in brothels. Within two years, the homicide rate dropped from 80/100,000 people to under 50/100,000 people. As a result of the success of this pilot project, a new national law has been introduced that establishes a national security council to coordinate reform of the security sector and to develop citizen security plans in each municipality in Guatemala. UNDP is supporting the implementation of this new legislation.

In **Haiti**, people do not trust their institutions. To try and change this, the UN Mission established community forums of local authorities, representatives of the population, NGOs, representatives of public services, and community associations. Haiti's Community Violence Reduction Programme has worked with these forums to develop violence reduction plans on the basis of a community security assessment.

In **Liberia**, UNDP's Community-based Recovery Programme supported establishing district development committees that include local chiefs, women, youth and ex-combatants. Liberia's Community Security Programme works with these committees to develop community security plans.

Source: UNDP 2009

Across Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, UN-Habitat's 'Safer Cities' Programme has helped catalyse and shape municipal crime and violence prevention strategies in urban settings.¹⁰ The approach combines local level assessments such as victimization surveys with identifying and mobilizing a 'safety coalition' of key local partners, including civil society, the private sector and the criminal justice system. Local strategies are developed in partnership with the local authority outlining both short- and long-term prevention activities. The aim is to entrench a participatory approach and support incorporating AVR across local government structures, the criminal justice system and related policy and planning processes (see Box 5).

Safer Cities: the Dar es Salam, Tanzania experience

The Safer Cities Programme was established in 1999 and victimization surveys were undertaken in 2000 and 2004. A coalition involving grassroots participants (ward leaders, the police, community members and organizations) receives political and financial support from government. The resulting programme has supported developing a crime prevention strategy and several pilot projects (i.e. youth livelihood, sensitization, ward tribunals, a drug campaign).

The programme has strong support from the city commission and the police, with the result that the project and its approach, objectives and activities were included in the municipal restructuring plan. As part of these efforts, a Safer Cities Unit has been set up within Dar es Salam's city structure, which has helped to make these concepts permanent. Now the Dar es Salam Unit is providing guidance to other municipal Safer Cities units. The project is now being replicated in other towns in Tanzania.

Source: UN-Habitat 2007

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 98.

2.1.2 Linkage between local and national levels

Municipal and local governments play a critical role in reducing armed violence, but locally led and supported initiatives also require supportive policies, development plans, cross-sector coordination and financial resources from national governments.

For example, community policing efforts,¹¹ which often form part of a comprehensive local approach to AVR, usually require reform, coordination and standards provided by a higher level government. In Latin America and the Caribbean it has been difficult to improve local police management and administration, i.e. community based policing, because this move needs concurrent activities at local and national levels. Many police departments are managed and financed by the national or federal government which limits the control a mayor or any other local authority has over law enforcement activities. Furthermore, in some instances, municipal and national police forces may have an adversarial or competing relationship.¹²

Certain risk factors behind local violence may only be able to be dealt with at the national level. This means that integrating AVR into local planning and coordination frameworks requires a supportive national policy and legislative framework across a number of sectors. For example, reducing the availability of arms requires national laws and effective customs and border controls.¹³ The capacity of government institutions may need strengthening to coordinate work on AVR and community security. This can include institutions in the prime minister's office, the ministry of national security, the ministry of the interior or the ministry of local government.¹⁴ Vertical linkages between local and national structures are necessary to ensure that local initiatives can be sustained and are adequately reflected in national level policy and planning (see Box 6).

BOX 6

Kenya's National Steering Committee (NSC) on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management

About a decade ago, the Government of Kenya wanted to strengthen, coordinate and harmonize various conflict management initiatives across the country. By 2001, the Government and civil society organizations (CSOs) had jointly established a National Steering Committee within the Office of the President.

The NSC has members from government departments, civil society organizations, UN bodies, regional organizations and the donor community. Its Secretariat has a mandate to oversee coordination of activities in four areas: peacebuilding and conflict management; implementing conflict early warning and response activities; community policing initiatives; and reducing illicit small arms and light weapons in the country.

In the past, the NSC has struggled to adequately link national level and local delivery mechanisms and initiatives such as district peace committees. However, progress is now being made on this issue, including introducing new tools and computer software to monitor local developments and guide national responses.

Source: www.peacenetkenya.org

11 Community-based policing helps to improve community safety, enhance access to justice and reduce crime through bringing together the police, civil society and local communities to develop local solutions to local security concerns.

12 Inter-American Development Bank, Technical Note 8 'Violence Control at the Municipal Level', Social Development Department, 1999, p. 5.

13 UNDP, 'Community Security and Social Cohesion, Towards a UNDP Approach', Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2005, p. 11.

14 Ibid. p. 36.

2.2 Overview of existing efforts to integrate AVR into national development plans

The supportive national level policies and development plans highlighted above cover a wide range of sectors.¹⁵ They are critical to local success in AVR, particularly when based on a clear understanding of the risk factors and effects. A cross-sector action agenda can be generated at the national level by bringing together development and security stakeholders around a common vision of the context-specific dimensions of armed violence.

Some of the best examples of comprehensive national approaches can be found in middle-income countries, for example in Latin America. In these countries, government structures are robust and there is more capacity for data collection, management and diagnostics. Governments are also often more aware of the scale and nature of the challenge and sometimes, following a series of failed police crackdowns, they also realize the limitations of enforcement-only responses (see Box 7).

BOX 7

Brazil's National Programme for Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI)

In Brazil, the 2007 National Programme for Public Security with Citizenship (PRONASCI) was created to reduce armed violence by coordinating public security and social policies in partnership with various federal, state and municipal government bodies, as well as with civil society. The approach includes improving public and prison security, stronger measures to fight organized crime and corruption, and a critical preventive/rehabilitative focus on young adults who are at risk of committing crimes or who have already offended. The effort is supported by multidisciplinary teams that include social workers, psychologists, educators and other specialists.

PRONASCI is currently also exploring new programming approaches that build on the experience gained through disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). This includes a programme to disarm, mobilize and integrate ex-gang members into mainstream society. It involves work on police-youth relations, legislative reform, weapon collection campaigns, and social mobilization and reconciliation initiatives that aim to expand opportunities and choices for youth.

Source: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 2009

2.2.1 AVR and poverty reduction strategy papers¹⁶

In less developed contexts, poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and their related implementation frameworks can potentially encompass broadened perspectives on armed violence, and responses to it. Evidence suggests a few countries are moving in this direction (see Box 8). If used in government and donor planning and budgeting, PRSPs can help prioritize various risk factors for armed violence and they are critical for enabling donor engagement.

¹⁵ Relevant sectors and issue areas include: poverty reduction, rural and urban development, youth, employment, gender equality, health, education, various aspects of governance (notably national safety and security strategies), crime reduction and protection of vulnerable groups.

¹⁶ Poverty reduction strategy papers were introduced in the late 1990s and are standard tools for low- and middle-income countries to articulate medium-term macroeconomic and social policies for growth and poverty reduction. Countries take the lead in creating a development plan, while the World Bank and other donors align their assistance programmes with national strategies.

Integrating AVR into PRSPs in Liberia and Uganda

'Consolidating Peace and Security' constitutes the first of four pillars of the **Liberian Poverty Reduction Strategy** which is taking a comprehensive approach to the country's security sector. Key priorities include consolidating peace by advancing security-sector reform through developing sound overall policy and institutional restructuring. The PRS outlines concrete steps towards accomplishing these goals including implementing a National Security Sector Strategy and Implementation Matrix; developing a legal framework for a new streamlined National Security Architecture, and reorganizing Liberian security forces. In addition, the PRS identifies strengthening human and personal security (particularly addressing gender-based violence), and building regional peace and security as key security objectives. The third pillar of the strategy, Strengthening Governance and the Rule of Law, reflects the need to integrate security issues within the country's broader governance framework. Peacebuilding is also identified as a cross-cutting issue that will lead to a more integrated approach to AVR.¹⁷

In Uganda, armed violence issues are considered a high priority within the country's **Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)**, which is its poverty reduction strategy paper. The third of the four pillars in this paper is dedicated to 'Security, Conflict Resolution and Disaster Management'. Key priorities under this pillar include enhanced engagement with civil society organizations, strengthened livelihood development, and implementing the National Action Plan on Arms Management and Disarmament. Pillar four aims to reduce armed violence under the 'Justice Law and Order Sector', for example, through community-based policing activities and DDR and SALW control activities.

In addition, a National Plan for Northern Uganda Peace Recovery and Development (PRDP) has been developed. It provides a comprehensive strategic framework for interventions in Northern Uganda with priorities to be reflected in district development plans.

Source: World Bank 2009

However, in Africa and parts of South Asia, integrating AVR into national development planning remains the exception rather than the norm. If AVR is integrated into poverty reduction strategy processes, it still tends to be considered predominantly a security, justice sector or SALW issue. This does not match the needs of AVR since successful responses to armed violence require strategies that address a range of common underlying risk factors beyond security or justice sectors.

In these contexts, further action is required to create the conditions necessary to respond comprehensively to AVR needs within national policies and planning frameworks. In countries where integrating a comprehensive AVR approach into PRSPs has been more successful, there have been several 'success factors' and key entry points including:

- **Community consultation**

Community consultation as part of the development of national strategies has provided an opportunity for more inclusive public debate on armed violence issues. It has boosted discussion of the multiple interlocking factors that fuel armed violence, and highlighted the importance of integrated, multisector responses.¹⁸ Consultation with the most vulnerable communities and populations affected by armed violence has ensured important perspectives are brought forward (see Box 9).

¹⁷ Garrasi, D, Kuttner, S and Wam P E, The Security Sector and Poverty Reduction Strategies, Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network, World Bank, September 2009, p. 21.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 83.

- **Cross-government engagement**

At the same time, evidence suggests it is important to involve key government ministries and departments. These are typically excluded in national development or PRSP discussions and processes in defining an AVR agenda.¹⁹ On security issues in particular, economic and social ministries are left out of discussions which usually only involve officials responsible for defence and law enforcement. In some countries, the PRS process has created an opportunity for constructive engagement between development and security specialists within government, although dialogue on security tends to remain politically sensitive (see Box 9).

BOX 9

PRS consultation and dialogue processes in Burundi

In Burundi, participatory approaches to the PRS process focused on reaching out to populations most affected by the conflict and violence, including those in remote areas. Civil society organizations active in conflict-affected zones received training in methodologies and support that contributed to carrying out participatory appraisals. The effort widened the spectrum of views included in the final PRS and helped build local capacities for future engagement in policy-making and development programmes.²⁰

Establishing focus groups on security sector issues enabled security sector actors and PRS teams to engage in a constructive dialogue on national priorities.²¹

Source: World Bank 2009

- **Research and assessments**

Accurate data and research is critical for catalysing government action and informing national strategies, policies and programmes. This involves linking poverty diagnostics with armed violence assessments to determine how the two are linked in a particular context.²²

2.2.2 AVR and national security strategies

National security strategies, national action plans on SALW and national conflict prevention strategies are not development plans in themselves, but they are all frameworks and policies that can support a comprehensive approach to AVR. They tend to be supported by national security commissions or small arms and light weapons national commissions, and can provide a basis for coordinating a 'whole-of-government' approach. These strategies and plans work as long as they: take a broad view that addresses demand as well as supply factors; have adequate resources; and are accepted across government processes (see Box 10).

BOX 10

The National Security Strategy in Jamaica

Jamaica's National Security Strategy includes a comprehensive range of reform programmes including new divisions of responsibilities between Jamaican police and defence forces, review of the criminal justice and legislative systems, reform of intelligence systems, the dismantling of organized crime groups, and local crime prevention and community development projects in targeted neighbourhoods.

Source: OECD 2009

19 OECD, 'Conflict and Fragility: Armed Violence Reduction, Enabling Development', OECD, 2009, p. 83.

20 Fruchart, V, Wam, P E, Webster, W, 'Effective Poverty Reduction Strategies in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries: Lessons and Suggestions', Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network, World Bank, September 2009 p. 9.

21 Garrasi, D, Kuttner, S and Wam P E, 'The Security Sector and Poverty Reduction Strategies', Social Development Department, Sustainable Development Network, World Bank, September 2009, p. 9-10.

22 World Bank, 'The Security Sector and Poverty Reduction Strategies', World Bank Social Development Note No. 114, July 2008.

2.2.3 The public health approach to AVR

A public health approach to diagnosing and preventing armed violence relies on many data sources, including existing national and municipal surveillance systems (for example the crime observatories described in Section 2.1.1). They also use epidemiological tools to map the geographic and demographic incidence of violence, and to identify violence-related risks and protective factors at various levels. This approach is most suited to middle-income countries with established national and local surveillance mechanisms and standardized reporting procedures. It is particularly popular in parts of Latin America and South Africa.

In fact, public health methodology has been key to mobilizing governments to design AVR response strategies (see Box 11). Several countries are implementing the recommendations of the World Report on Violence and Health launched in 2002 by the World Health Organization (WHO). National activities include report launches, appointing health ministry focal points for violence prevention, preparing national reports on violence and health, and establishing prevention programmes.²³ For example, in 2007, Mexico prepared a national report on violence and health, which it is using as a platform to develop a national action plan to prevent violence.

BOX 11

WHO: Promising strategies for reducing the incidence and effects of violence

WHO's World Report on Violence and Health promotes violence prevention agendas that aim to:

1. Increase safe, stable, and nurturing relationships between children and their parents and caregivers.
2. Reduce availability and abuse of alcohol.
3. Reduce access to lethal means.
4. Improve life skills and enhance opportunities for children and youth.
5. Promote gender equality and empower women.
6. Change cultural norms that support violence.
7. Improve criminal justice systems.
8. Improve social welfare systems.
9. Reduce social distance between conflicting groups.
10. Reduce economic inequality and concentrated poverty.

Source: WHO, 2008. Cit: OECD, 2009

2.3 Obstacles and gaps

There are a number of obstacles to successfully integrating AVR into local and national development strategies. These include:

- **Capacity gaps**

In weak and fragile contexts, local and national governments often do not have enough institutional capacity to prioritize AVR and develop and apply effective responses to armed violence across government. They also face difficulties in generating adequate and reliable data on the level and nature of armed violence that affects communities. An inaccurate understanding of the scale and underlying causes of the problem means governments and communities find it difficult to monitor and evaluate the impact of AVR initiatives. This can also lead to inappropriate or counterproductive responses or to governments that take no action.

²³ See http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/world_report/en/index.html.

- **‘Whole-of-government’ challenges**

‘Whole-of-government’ perspectives and action are essential for a sustained and comprehensive approach to AVR. However, many countries experiencing chronic violence face significant challenges in achieving this and in coordinating the efforts of both governmental and non-governmental actors. Key obstacles include a lack of resources and institutional capacity among partners, intense and personalized interministerial competition between politicized entities, and in some cases, endemic nepotism and corruption.²⁴ In certain contexts, interministerial coordinating mechanisms or focal points, such as small arms and light weapons national commissions (which also encompass AVR), have been set up to address these issues. However, too often they lack the resources and political backing to make a significant difference.

- **Political challenges**

Political commitment to an integrated preventative approach to AVR can be difficult to sustain, particularly at the local level where the turnover of leadership and key staff is greatest.²⁵ Electorates are often keen to see immediate results and visible actions, for example, via tougher policing. This gives governments incentives to favour this type of reactive short-term approach over a longer-term investment in prevention. At the same time, armed violence can be a particularly sensitive issue for some governments that may be reluctant to accept external support for AVR programmes.

- **Doing harm**

External participants in AVR activities often do not understand the context in which they are working. This creates the danger of doing harm. ‘Insensitive’ approaches can inadvertently strengthen the drivers of violence or give credibility to illegitimate actors.

2.4 Lessons learned and recommendations

The previous section has highlighted positive experiences and underlined conditions that are particularly conducive to integrating comprehensive AVR approaches into national and local development plans. In particular the section stresses the importance of:

- **Local knowledge and analysis**

The AVR approach is based on scientific methods. It aims to use data and local knowledge to identify local risk factors for violence and to target interventions or programmes to address them. This targeted approach has proven effective. It is also the basis for recommending that practitioners prioritize evidence-based identification of armed violence risk factors and patterns of violence.

- **Adapting to context**

This overview has stressed learning from good process and adapting potentially promising approaches to local contexts. This also emphasizes the importance of building on existing societal and institutional capacities. In other words, priorities should be based on evidence of local risk-factors for violence. But, deciding how best to put the priorities into practice is likely to be experimental and action needs to relate to what may work in a given context.

²⁴ OECD, ‘Conflict and Fragility: Armed Violence Reduction, Enabling Development’, OECD, 2009, p. 83.

²⁵ Ibid, p. 22.

- **Multisectoral approaches**

All violence is context specific, but there is a set of common risk factors that is common to different forms of violence. Tackling these common risk factors can be the core of a long-term AVR preventive approach. However, these core risk factors relate to individuals, institutions and instruments, which means that strategic engagement requires a multisectoral approach. This should enhance the work of formal security and justice services with targeted direct programming in community and urban security and with socioeconomic development, education and health programmes that are adapted to better address armed violence risk factors.

- **Integrating AVR into local and national government policies and planning**

A key lesson is that sustained cross-sectoral preventive responses require integrating and entrenching AVR in local government development planning structures and policies. This needs to be coupled with adequate national coordination and action. Development plans that prioritize AVR can increase institutional capacities, provide adequate diagnostics and consultation processes, and reinforce political will and cross-government engagement. Successfully integrating AVR into development plans helps create an enabling environment, and can mobilize support for armed violence priorities from within government, from civil society and the private sector and from external donors.

3. Integrating AVR into overseas development assistance strategies

This section views the AVR challenge from the donor perspective. Section 3.1 traces the recent history of donor engagement in AVR, and highlights key features of OECD DAC policy on AVR. Section 3.2 shows how donors have begun to integrate AVR priorities into their work by adapting their assessments, funding instruments and programming. Section 3.3 highlights some common obstacles that donors face in prioritizing AVR, and Section 3.4 identifies some of the lessons they have learned.

3.1 Policy shifts in overseas development strategies and the OECD guidance

At least since the mid 1990s, donors have recognized the interdependencies between security and development. One of their first responses was to develop conflict prevention strategies. This led to some dedicated programming designed to tackle the drivers of conflict and to support transformative processes of political and social change. Based on evidence of the potential of aid to make tensions worse and ‘do harm’, the conflict prevention agenda also promotes conflict-sensitivity in analysis and programme design across all interventions in conflict-affected areas. The donor community has also increasingly focused on the challenge of building legitimate and effective security and justice institutions, particularly in post-conflict or otherwise fragile contexts. This has led to new policy guidelines and increased donor funding for security system reform.²⁶

More recently, in response to the changing nature and distribution of violence, donors have become aware of the broader challenge of armed violence, whether it is associated with conflict, crime or interpersonal violence. This is reflected in the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence²⁷ and the UN Secretary-General’s Report on Armed Violence and Development.²⁸ Both of these signal the importance of prevention and reduction for achieving the MDGs through to 2015 and beyond.

²⁶ OECD DAC, *Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice*, 2007 and OECD DAC, *Justice and Security Delivery in Fragile States*, 2007.

²⁷ Geneva Declaration Secretariat, *Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development*, 2006.


²⁸ United Nations, *United Nations Secretary-General’s Report on Armed Violence and Development*, A/64/228, 2009.

The OECD DAC work on AVR resulted from a diverse group of donors and practitioners concluding that better analysis and more targeted assistance can deliver measurable AVR results. This group included practitioners working on conflict prevention, peacebuilding, crime prevention and public health. Together they helped produce the first OECD policy paper on Armed Violence Reduction in 2009.²⁹ This stated that AVR is about generating more effective responses to the challenge of armed violence by addressing gaps in existing programming (i.e. urban, gang and youth interpersonal violence). It is also about tailoring and synchronizing existing approaches (at local, national and regional levels) to better address risk factors in emerging areas of underdevelopment and insecurity.

The OECD DAC paper recognized that each situation of violence is unique, with different manifestations of violence – conflict, social and criminal – often strongly connected with common patterns of structural³⁰ and proximate³¹ risk factors. These commonalities open up opportunities for combining conflict, crime and public health approaches to diagnosing and responding to the challenge of violence at local levels. Similarly, based on the global or regional nature of external risk factors such as economic or environmental shocks, international corruption and trafficking, it is clear that that local action must be matched by efforts to address risks at national, regional and global levels.

To frame the AVR challenge, the OECD introduced the ‘armed violence lens’ (see Figure 1). It captures the key elements and levels that shape patterns of violence, namely: the people affected by violence, the perpetrators and their motivations, the availability of instruments (arms), and the wider institutional/cultural environment that enables or protects against violence. Analysis based on the lens encourages practitioners to consider the entirety of the problem even if they only work on one aspect of it. It can complement existing assessment tools such as conflict or stability assessments, governance and criminal justice assessments, or an analysis of the drivers of change. This approach helps produce more sophisticated diagnostics of the context-specific geographic and demographic patterns of violence. These assessments serve as a key entry point for donor engagement.

Figure 1: The armed violence lens



Source: OECD DAC 2009

29 OECD DAC, Armed Violence Reduction, Enabling Development, 2009.

30 Structural risk factors include: social, political and economic inequalities/exclusion; systemic unemployment and underemployment; rising perceptions of economic deprivation or grievances; rising expectations in the face of limited opportunities; weak or problematic governance; resource scarcity and competition; rapid and unregulated urbanization; demographic youth bulges, especially of young males in areas with limited education and employment opportunities; and unequal gender relations.

31 Proximate risk factors include: sharp economic shocks; natural (and human-induced disasters) such as drought; easy access to alcohol, narcotics and small arms, and fresh exposure to past violence.

To improve programming practice, the OECD guidance encouraged direct programming explicitly aimed at preventing and reducing violence, including through creative adaptation of existing local conflict, crime and violence prevention approaches. It also encouraged indirect programming, which involves adapting existing sector-specific strategies and interventions in order to better address known risk and protective factors. This includes the programming streams of poverty reduction, governance, security system reform, health, education, gender and the environment.

3.2 Overview of donor prioritization of armed violence prevention

This section provides a few illustrative examples of how donors are beginning to take on the armed violence challenge through international advocacy, and by adapting their strategies, assessment tools, funding instruments and programming in response to emerging landscapes of insecurity.

• Raising awareness and promoting the objectives of AVR

The development of the 2006 Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development³² has increased awareness of the global burden and changing nature of armed violence. Some 108 states have signed the Declaration and so have now committed themselves to achieving measurable reductions in armed violence by 2015. The Geneva Declaration process has been led by a core group of 14 signatories, including countries affected by high rates of violence as well as donors.³³ All donor signatory countries are evidently committed to prioritizing AVR, but they have chosen to do so in different ways. In some countries, notably Switzerland and Norway, a commitment to AVR is an explicit foreign and development policy priority.

Switzerland chairs the core group of the Geneva Declaration and actively supports its implementation through diplomatic channels and assistance to the Declaration Secretariat. AVR is also a foreign policy priority for Norway, which consistently voices strong support for AVR priorities in multilateral forums on disarmament, humanitarian or development action. The Oslo conference is one aspect of its multi-track effort to tackle 'the millennium challenge' of armed violence as a foreign and development priority and a humanitarian imperative.³⁴

• Integrating AVR into assessment methodologies and processes

Many donors routinely support conflict and stability, public health, and governance and justice sector assessments, as well as surveys of victimization or small arms surveys related to the availability, trade and demand for weapons. All of these assessment tools are relevant for AVR programming, but they tend to be linked to sectoral interventions. They are rarely used to analyse patterns of violence or to inform multisectoral interventions. However, donors are now recognizing that existing assessment tools do not adequately diagnose local patterns, drivers and connections between different forms of violence, and some are adapting their analysis tools.

For example, as a first step to integrating AVR priorities into its development work, the German Ministry for Development is currently reviewing its early warning and peace and conflict analysis instruments to assess whether they can be adapted to better capture social, criminal and domestic forms of violence. Sweden, Norway and the Netherlands have also supported new forms of programme design that better integrate local perceptions and analysis. For example, in Nepal they are supporting a team of anthropologists and researchers to work with local communities and UN agencies to design programmes that respond to local violence risk factors and opportunities to curb it.³⁵

32 Op. cit.

33 The core group of signatory states includes: Brazil, Colombia, Finland, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Spain, Switzerland (chair), Thailand and the United Kingdom.

34 State Secretary Gry Larsen spoke at the Humanitarian Forum in Oslo in November 2009, and outlined how Norway aims to support efforts to tackle the 'millennium challenge' of armed violence. The speech is available at: http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/Speeches-and-articles-by-political-staff/speeches_gry_larsen/2009/armed_violence.html?id=591225

35 This involves a team of researchers from the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) working to design AVR-sensitive programming with UNICEF. For more information see: http://www.unidir.org/bdd/fiche-activite.php?ref_activite=337.

- **Integrating AVR into donor strategies**

Few donors have explicitly prioritized reducing armed violence in their policy and programming strategies, although most pursue closely related objectives such as peacebuilding and security system reform (SSR). A 2007 survey of 13 OECD DAC members revealed that no government had established either a definition of, or a comprehensive policy directive, for addressing AVR.³⁶ Similarly, a 2008 review of Official Development Assistance (ODA) agency websites and policy documents showed that the highest prominence was given to collective or political violence. In cases where donors addressed interpersonal violence, it was usually in relation to gender violence.³⁷ The reality is that most donor policies to prevent or reduce violence tend to be framed in terms of conflict prevention, peacebuilding or post-conflict recovery.

In this past decade, donors increased their emphasis on peacebuilding and statebuilding, particularly in post-conflict settings, often with priority attention given to DDR and SSR interventions. They did this because they realized that the rush towards elections and market liberalization had placed post-conflict societies under additional stress, and that ex-combatants and security services constituted critical risk factors for violence in these contexts. In this way, donor peacebuilding and statebuilding priorities also aim to minimize armed violence risk factors and to promote institutional protective factors.

They have been doing this within a more overtly political statebuilding approach designed for situations where state capacity is severely limited and/or lacks legitimacy. Donors now recognize that statebuilding is a long-term, largely endogenous process that aims to strengthen the relationship between state and society. They also increasingly recognize their limited ability to engineer societal change, and that efforts to import institutional models are rarely successful. This has led to greater donor 'humility'. They are increasingly rejecting template solutions and encouraging inclusive, locally-attuned programming and 'organic' approaches to institution-building.³⁸

Donors often place violence reduction within their strategies on fragility and violent conflict, but several are expanding these strategies to address the broader problem of armed violence.³⁹ The World Development Report 2011 of the World Bank provides a clear example of this approach (see Box 13).

³⁶ OECD DAC Network on Conflict Peace and Development Co-operation, *A Framing Paper for OECD DAC Guidance on Armed Violence Reduction*, 27 July 2007.

³⁷ World Health Organization, *Preventing Violence and Reducing its Impact: How Development Agencies Can Help*, 2008, p. 21.

³⁸ OECD DAC Conflict and Fragility, *Do No Harm: International Support for Statebuilding*, 2010.

³⁹ In some cases this is a work in progress. For example, the European Union is in the process of considering how AVR priorities will be integrated in the *EU Action Plan for Situations of Fragility and Conflict* and in the 10-year review of the *EU Programme on Conflict Prevention* in 2011. In any case, this established programme is fairly consistent with the AVR approach. It emphasizes the need to promote 'structural stability' by addressing risk factors, and differentiates between efforts to address structural risk factors through long-term indirect 'conflict sensitive' programming, and efforts that have prevention as their primary objective.

The World Bank and the World Development Report 2011

The World Bank has always seen violent conflict as a profound development challenge and it still is one of its central concerns. However, in response to the shifting dynamics and nature of violence, the Bank has broadened its interpretation of violent conflict to include different forms of violence, whether they are associated with political conflict, social conflict or crime. This will be clearly reflected in the 2011 World Development Report (WDR) 2011 which aims to sharpen the discussion on what can be done to support societies struggling to prevent or come to grips with violence.

The 2011 WDR begins by analysing trends in violence and fragility. This confirms that the incidence and severity of state-to-state conflicts and civil wars have declined significantly in recent years. At the same time, several long-running conflicts have resisted resolution, and several 'post-conflict' countries remain fragile and could possibly fall back into violence. The Bank also documents that countries once seen as stable have experienced recent violence, and that non-traditional forms of conflict (sub-national, gang- and drug-related) are on the rise and have a serious impact on economic development in lower-, middle- and higher-income countries.

The central thesis of the 2011 WDR is that confidence in the legitimacy of government actions is essential for any sustained success. It is critical of how the international community has focused on institution and statebuilding that favours form over function. It also finds there is an excessive focus on post-conflict recovery, which leaves some countries struggling to prevent violence with no assistance. It builds on this analysis and identifies several priority interventions at local, national, regional and global levels that can address the human and structural factors that are catalysts for violence.

In short, although the 2011 WDR frames its analysis in terms of the concepts of 'stress, capabilities and expectations' rather than the 'armed violence lens', it is broadly consistent with the AVR objectives and approach. It concludes that violence prevention is under-resourced, and that the international community must do better to support countries struggling to face violent challenges, and to do so without recourse to repressive methods.⁴⁰

Source: World Bank, 2010⁴¹

In addition to their work on violent conflict and fragility, most donors also prioritize efforts to promote justice and security sector reform and to control small arms and light weapons, including in situations that are not affected by political conflict. Many have therefore developed relevant sectoral strategies and programming guidance to address armed violence risk factors associated with institutions and instruments. These strategies are not typically framed in terms of violence prevention or reduction objectives. SSR interventions in particular tend to focus on national programming. However, this is also changing as donors combine strengthening security and justice sector strategies and programmes with efforts to promote citizen or community security. The UK is one example of a donor that is integrating AVR priorities through its efforts to promote 'the provision of security and justice as a basic service' (see Box 14).

40 Integration of AVR priorities is also reflected in the Bank's organization of its thematic work. In 2009 a new team working on Conflict, Crime and Violence (CCV) was set-up within the Social Development Department. It complements the work of the Fragile States Unit and pursues some of the work previously covered by the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. However, it broadens its approaches and aims to support the World Bank's efforts 'to make societies more resilient to violence.' To improve understanding of the role of CCV within the development context, the unit also conducts some of the data collection, analysis and evaluations needed to build the evidence base for this work. For instance, the CCV team conducts research on size and trends of conflict and violence, and maintains three global datasets with country-level data on: violent conflict, homicides and domestic violence.

41 The World Development Report 2011 will be published later this year. This summary is based on the 70-page 'Concept Note' for the report.

The UK: The Department for International Development (DFID) White Paper 2009 'Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future'

The most recent UK development strategy is DFID's 2009 White Paper. It includes a chapter on 'building peaceful states and societies' that highlights the debilitating impact of fragility and conflict on development. It also acknowledges that 'we have to pay even more attention to crime and violence in cities and the growing problem of international organized crime'. It calls for a 'new approach' that 'focus[es] directly on what makes states fragile and fuels violence'. It also outlines how it will adapt DFID's work to: help build peaceful states and societies as a foundation for sustainable development; treat access to security and justice as a basic service; support economic opportunities; work more effectively across government departments; and deliver a faster and coordinated international response in the immediate aftermath of conflicts.

Of these priority areas, DFID's efforts to address AVR are linked with its security and justice commitments. The UK has pledged to triple bilateral funding for security and justice to \$182 million by 2014. The White Paper clarifies this involves support for better service delivery at state, local and non-state levels in both fragile and more stable environments. This emphasis is therefore consistent with general AVR priorities of developing multilevel approaches, including a strong bottom-up community component.

One example of this integrated, multilevel approach is in Bangladesh, where the UK's DFID is spending \$45.5 million to promote security and justice in a programme that includes \$7.6 million to develop a five-year vision for justice reform; \$15.2 million for community policing and \$22.8 million to promote community legal services. DFID also provides substantial funding for community security programmes in southern Sudan and Jamaica.

Source: DFID, 2009⁴²

All donors support programmes that aim to promote economic and social development, education and public health, and that indirectly address various risk factors, including for individuals. Yet, integrating AVR objectives and priorities into these sector strategies and guidance is rare. In other words, donors have not prioritized armed violence prevention in some programming areas that are best placed to address them.

- **Adapting funding instruments to address AVR**

Donors that support direct AVR programming have often identified it as an objective of a particular thematic funding instrument. The Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund is a good example of how the terms of reference for a Fund can be aligned with AVR priorities (see Box 15).

⁴² UK: DFID White Paper on Development, *Eliminating World Poverty: Building our Common Future*, 2009.

The Millennium Development Goal Achievement Fund (MDG-F)

The MDG-F demonstrates how AVR priorities can be integrated into conflict prevention and peacebuilding funding instruments. The MDG-F aims to accelerate progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) worldwide. It was established in December 2006 through a \$708.8 million contribution from the Spanish Government to the United Nations system. Of this, some US\$94 million has been allocated to projects within the 'conflict prevention and peacebuilding' window. Country eligibility has been determined in line with the Spanish Master Plan for International Cooperation 2005-2008, with the result that a relatively high proportion of projects are implemented in Latin America and the Caribbean.⁴³

Project proposals are formulated at country level with on average six UN agencies, local governments and civil society partners involved in each case. The MDG-F conflict prevention and peacebuilding programme terms of reference are broad in scope and also encompass efforts to address high levels of interpersonal violence and public insecurity. The programme has four priority support areas, one of which deals specifically with supporting capacities for AVR.⁴⁴ It explicitly aims to support efforts to mainstream AVR into national development frameworks, support multi-stakeholder crime and violence prevention processes and strategies, and build institutional capacity, including for data collection and analysis.

The MDG-F also supports AVR priorities by strongly emphasizing inclusive programme design, comprehensive multisectoral approaches and tailored responses to local dynamics of violence, based on relevant data where possible. All programmes financed by the MDG-F are required to demonstrate measurable results. This involves identifying key indicators and the means to collect relevant data during and after the programme period.

Source: MDG-F website

Some funding instruments that were originally designed to address political conflict are now being used to support preventive approaches to reducing violence in diverse contexts of insecurity. For example, this is the case with the European Union Instrument for Stability (see Box 16), with the Stability Fund of the Netherlands⁴⁵ and with the UK Conflict Pool.⁴⁶ The Terms of Reference of the UN Peacebuilding Fund were also revised in 2009 so that it can now fund a broader range of activities and countries.⁴⁷

Some donors have also used human rights funding instruments to support projects that aim to assist vulnerable or at-risk groups. For example, the EU Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)⁴⁸ has been used to support projects aimed at diminishing intra-family violence and violence against women in Guatemala, reducing physical and humiliating punishment against children and adolescents in Venezuela, and addressing inter-ethnic tensions through dialogue in Kosovo.

43 The Fund supports 54 programmes in Latin America and the Caribbean, 24 programmes in Africa, 20 in Asia, 18 in Eastern Europe and 13 in the Arab states.

44 The other three priority areas are: enhancing capacities for conflict prevention and management, supporting SSR and the rule of law, and supporting sustainable recovery and reintegration at the local level.

45 The Stability Fund was established in 2004 and is intended to implement the Dutch government's thematic policies on post-conflict reconstruction, mine clearance and small arms. It is also intended to implement the government's geographic policies, in particular in relation to the Horn of Africa, the Great Lakes region, Afghanistan and the Western Balkans, which collectively receive at least 75% of the Fund. In 2008, it had a budget of \$116.8 million.

46 The 'Conflict Pool' has a budget of \$259.5 million in 2009/10. It is used to fund conflict-prevention interventions across Africa, the Middle East, wider Europe (the Balkans and Russia, CIS) and South Asia, and also supports stabilization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has also been used to support a survey of armed violence in Yemen.

47 The Peacebuilding Fund was launched in 2006. It currently has an allocation of US\$ 349 million. It is used to support initiatives that: respond to imminent threats to the peace process and that support peace agreements and political dialogue; build or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict; stimulate economic revitalization to general peace dividends; and/or reestablish essential administrative services.

48 This was launched in 2007 and has a budget of \$1.104 million for the period 2007-2013.

The European Union (EU) and the Instrument for Stability

The EU's Instrument for Stability was established in 2007 and was designed to address risks to security at local and national levels, as well as various security challenges (notably relating to small arms, organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking and nuclear proliferation) at regional and global levels. It includes a relatively flexible 'crisis response' component designed to provide 'exceptional' support to prevent conflict or promote stability. Most support has been targeted at national SSR efforts, as well as some post-disaster/conflict recovery priorities. A small proportion has been used to support attempts to promote 'social stability' through a range of local interventions.

A good example of direct AVR programming support is its assistance to urban regeneration of the violence-affected quarter of Martissant in Port-au-Prince, Haiti (\$4 million in 2008/9). This combined a range of municipal capacity-building elements with support for social and education programmes, and a youth employment-generation scheme. Elsewhere, for example, in Peru, the Philippines, Timor-Leste and Uganda, this funding instrument has been used to support efforts to promote social peace and stability including through attempts to improve citizen participation, surveillance and dialogue on conflict and violence prevention priorities.

EU assistance in Syria also provides an example of how Instrument for Stability funding has been used to complement EU development and humanitarian interventions by addressing the risk factor of youth exclusion. In addition to \$62.3 million EU humanitarian and development assistance for Iraqi and Palestinian refugees in Syria, the Instrument for Stability provided some \$6.7 million to support three projects to provide education, vocational training for youth and assistance for victims of gender based violence.

Source: *European Commission, 2009*⁴⁹

- **Supporting innovative preventive programming**

In Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, various donors have supported direct AVR programming that specifically aims to reduce and prevent armed violence. Many countries in Latin America and the Caribbean experience armed violence challenges, particularly in rapidly urbanizing areas. Donors with this regional focus were among the first to develop 'stand-alone' preventive programming in these contexts. For example, the Inter-American Development Bank has been a pioneer in stand-alone violence reduction operations (see Box 17). Similarly, the World Bank's Small Grants Programme for Violence Prevention supports municipal-level initiatives that advance community-based perspectives on how to reduce armed violence.

USAID is an example of a donor that has prioritized innovative programming targeted at youth at risk in relation to violence and gangs. The current five-year USAID strategy for the Latin American and Caribbean regions emphasizes youth issues, and regional USAID expenditure on youth programming is significant.⁵⁰

49 The Instrument for Stability has a budget of \$2.768 billion for 2007-2013, divided between a short-term component on crisis response (\$1.9 billion - 72% of the total) and a long-term component addressing trans-regional threats (\$649.7 million - 23% of the total). The crisis response component is designed to fund actions that cannot be funded through other development or humanitarian instruments. European Commission, *Annual Report from the European Commission on the Instrument for Stability in 2008, 2009*, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ifis/index_en.htm.

50 For an overview of USAID youth programming in Latin America and the Caribbean see: <http://jamaica.usaid.gov/en/Article.1196.aspx>.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

For the IDB, 'citizen security' is a serious development issue "because violence is a significant obstacle to economic development and directly affects sizable portions of the Latin American and Caribbean population, particularly the poor". The IDB website also notes that the Bank was 'the first multilateral institution to tackle the issues of violence prevention and citizen security through a series of interventions over the last ten years, including loans and technical cooperation for over US\$200 million that have benefitted 15 countries.⁵¹

The first violence reduction loans were approved in 1998 (in response to requests from Colombia and Uruguay). Since then, the IDB has supported a range of interventions aimed at reducing the levels of juvenile crime and violence through social prevention services, strengthening institutions responsible for security, promoting activities to counter domestic violence, as well as creating relevant information systems.

Drawing on this experience and on IDB best practise analysis of programming,⁵² in 2003 the IDB adopted Guidelines on the Design of Violence Reduction Projects. The guidelines justified IDB emphasis on prevention activities, stressing that 'they are generally more cost-effective than control measures, and they are more consistent with the IDB mission as a development bank'. The guidelines identified the following potential areas for bank support: information systems and research, health, education, justice (judicial services and judicial reform), media, police, prisons (inmate rehabilitation) and situational prevention and social prevention, including community-based initiatives and legislative action.

In short, the IDB promotes a comprehensive approach to AVR that combines security and justice sector support with social prevention. To promote this approach, 'citizen security and violence prevention' has been identified as a priority theme in the business plan of the Institutional Capacity and Finance Sector of the IDB, and a thematic team is dedicated to integrating these issues into the Bank's work.

Source: IDB website

There are various ways donors can use and adapt existing thematic or geographic funding instruments to promote direct AVR programming. The above overview shows that direct AVR programming is often supported through existing conflict prevention, peacebuilding, disarmament or human rights funding instruments.

Donors also support AVR programming indirectly through other thematic or geographic development funding instruments, but this is usually not rationalized or categorized as funding for AVR. Therefore, more research is required to identify and assess how donors have integrated AVR priorities into other thematic or geographic strategies. However, it is clear that poverty reduction, governance, security sector reform, health, education, and environmental programming can, and often do, include sub-components that address armed violence risk or protective factors.

For example, health and education programming can include efforts to: raise awareness of the costs and impacts of violence; target populations that are excluded and at risk; promote health and education programmes to encourage social cohesion; and build public health institutional capacity for violence and crime reporting.⁵³ However, whether indirect programming fulfils its AVR potential will depend on the level of agency commitment to integrating AVR priorities into sectoral strategies, and on the quality of the design and implementation of specific interventions.

51 In its 'Security and Violence' topic area, the IDB has provided support for AVR projects in: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. Information on the projects is available at: <http://www.iadb.org/topics/topic.cfm?id=CRSE&lang=en>.

52 A series of IDB 'technical notes' were developed to describe the nature and magnitude of violence in the region, its causes and effects, and to analyse best practice in preventive programme design.

53 OECD DAC, *Armed Violence Reduction*, op. cit. p. 89.

3.3 Obstacles and gaps

Donors face several challenges that constrain their ability to effectively tackle the issue of armed violence. These include:

- **Conceptual limitations**

How donors respond to the challenge of violence depends on the way it is categorized, i.e. as crime or conflict. This has obscured the strong connections between different forms of violence, with the result that programming frameworks are ill-equipped to address the linkages between them.

- **Gaps in evidence**

In developing contexts with high levels of armed violence, systems for reporting it are often weak. This prevents development practitioners from correctly identifying the risks and impacts of violence, and from developing targeted intervention programmes. The data-deficit also makes establishing what works more challenging. This is why donors that support direct AVR programming typically insist on assessments, diagnostics and 'measurable results', and why some also back independent efforts to gather data on violence, for example by supporting 'crime observatories' or regular surveys.

- **Funding challenges**

Both the OECD guidance and the World Bank⁵⁴ argue that there is not enough investment in prevention. ODA has been on the increase, but it has been estimated that approximately 50 percent of fragile countries will experience a fall in country programmable aid between 2009 and 2011.⁵⁵ Some donors view preventive approaches as particularly cost-effective, yet prevention receives relatively little funding, especially when compared with support for enforcement. This is in part because it is difficult to measure results in conflict prevention⁵⁶ and violence reduction in data-poor developing contexts. However, it is also linked to bureaucratic constraints to programming above or below the state level. For example, the UN Peacebuilding Fund cannot fund regional stakeholders or interventions. Meanwhile, bureaucratic constraints prevent many donors from forming partnerships directly with local government or municipalities (the World Bank and IDB activities are notable exceptions to this.⁵⁷)

- **Programming gaps**

Donor programming is mainly concentrated in post-conflict transitional contexts, but it is often too narrowly conceived. Societies emerging from conflict often suffer from higher levels of 'normalized' violence, and violence shifts from war zones to under-governed urban slums. Yet, post-conflict donor interventions tend to focus on ex-combatants and the factors that led to political conflict. Not enough attention is paid to existing patterns of armed violence, post-war political economies, and to identifying risk factors for future violence. This also reflects donor inexperience with programming in urban areas and with addressing youth violence. There is evidence to suggest that targeted preventive interventions can reduce youth and gang violence,⁵⁸ but most donors have not developed programming to address youth at risk.

54 World Development Report 2011 (forthcoming).

55 OECD DAC, *Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind*, Summary Report, February 2010.

56 This is partly being addressed through efforts to improve measurement of conflict prevention. For example, OECD DAC has produced standards for monitoring and evaluating *direct* conflict prevention programming, and the UN Peacebuilding Support Office has examined indicators and benchmarks for peacebuilding at the country level.

57 For example, during the 1990s Bogota, Cali and Medellin each received loans from the IDB to finance violence reduction.

58 World Bank and UN Office of Drugs and Crime, *Crime, Violence and Development Trends, Costs and Policy Options in the Caribbean*, Report No 37820, 2007, WHO 2008, see note 5.

3.4 Lessons learned and recommendations

As indicated in Section 2, the AVR approach builds on promising experience with multisectoral approaches to tackling armed violence at the local level. It is also based on learning and insights from post-conflict recovery, institution or statebuilding, and experience with promoting economic and social development and security in developing contexts. These include the need: to consider demand factors in SALW control; for comprehensive approaches to DDR; to apply developmental and preventive approaches to dealing with crime and youth gangs; and for ‘whole-of-government’ approaches.⁵⁹

Taken together, these experiences point to the need for:

- **A multidimensional approach to addressing internal risk factors**

Research has demonstrated the strong connections between conflict and crime, and shows that they share many of the same risk factors (rising inequality, marginalized youth, legacies or violence and trauma). Practical experience has further demonstrated that conflict and crime prevention and public health approaches can be usefully combined. Therefore, donors should draw on conflict, rule of law, and social and economic development experience and funding streams to support multisectoral programming at the local and national level.

- **Multilevel engagement to address external risk factors**

Research and experience shows that some risk factors for violence are external (economic or environmental shocks, cross-border trafficking, or external interference). Many of these can best be addressed at a transnational level through diplomatic and law enforcement initiatives. But development stakeholders have a key role to play too. They should help ensure that transnational diplomatic or enforcement efforts are based on understanding the links between global factors and local contexts, support processes to address regional dynamics of violent conflict, and support efforts, at all levels to help build resilience to violence (and shocks) through social and institutional development.

- **Strengthened analysis and an inclusive approach to programme design**

The donor community has learned that effective preventive interventions require clear analysis of the context-specific geographic and demographic patterns of violence, as well as its risk and protective factors. This analysis can draw on available data of violence patterns to help identify ‘hot spots’ and critical risk and protective factors. Donors should support data collection, monitoring and research to build the evidence base for AVR programming. They should also promote interventions that draw on local knowledge and many sources of information, and that are developed through an inclusive design process.

- **Local and national capacity building**

The OECD DAC policy on fragility and statebuilding,⁶⁰ the World Development Report 2011⁶¹ of the World Bank, and the 2009 UN Secretary-General’s Report on Peacebuilding,⁶² show there is widespread recognition that confidence in the legitimacy of government actions is central to sustained success. This requires that governments are able to deliver key services. Yet, donors have a mixed record in supporting capacity building, and have often focused only on the national level. The donor community should increase its support for local and national capacity building, using an organic approach that emphasizes function over form and builds on existing societal and institutional capacities.

59 For further elaboration, see the OECD *Armed Violence Reduction*, pp. 46-49. Op. cit.

60 OECD DAC, *Do No Harm, and Ensuring Fragile States Are Not Left Behind*. op.cit.

61 World Bank, *World Development Report 2011*, Concept Note, op.cit.

62 United Nations, *Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 11 June 2009.

4. Conclusions

Many successful AVR initiatives have evolved from the bottom-up through community-led responses to local dynamics of insecurity. However, local governments are critical stakeholders and, particularly where locally elected, have an important and legitimate role in championing the participation of civil society, the private sector and criminal justice system in responding to armed violence. Integrating and entrenching AVR in local government development planning structures and policies, along with adequate national coordination and action, is central to a sustained, preventive and cross-sectoral response.

In fragile situations, where local government institutions' planning and coordination capacity is weaker, external participants can play an important role by actively supporting local initiatives. In these instances, community-led and externally supported AVR can support the development of local capacities. These initiatives also provide an entry point for wider local government engagement and – through institutional capacity building and governance-related interventions – can lay the foundations for local governments to include AVR in their development policies.

At the same time, integrating AVR objectives into national development plans is critical in order to provide an enabling environment for local initiatives, and to address national level risk factors. There are an increasing number of examples of AVR being considered within PRSP frameworks, although these remain the exception rather than the norm. Likewise, in some contexts national security strategies have proved a useful framework for supporting comprehensive approaches to AVR. In more developed contexts, such as in Latin America, governments are using a public health approach as the basis for national responses and action plans to prevent violence.

Donors are also increasingly aware of the risk factors that contribute to fragility and armed violence, both in and beyond conflict-affected areas. They have learned about the potential for their interventions to do harm if they are not based on understanding the local dynamics of insecurity. The promising experience with preventive programming and hard-won lessons about the limitations of alternative approaches, have resulted in an increase in donor interest in locally-generated approaches to preventing violence. This has led to various forms of adaptation, including greater attention to assessments, and a recognition that programming should be attuned to local risks and opportunities.

There has also been encouraging progress in integrating AVR priorities into sectoral policies on conflict or justice and security sector reform. In many cases, thematic strategies on peacebuilding have been expanded to address diverse contexts of insecurity. At the same time, strategies on building institutional capacity for justice and security now often make explicit reference to the need for complementary preventive community approaches. Yet, AVR integration into donor strategies remains relatively rare, especially in some sectors such as employment generation, education and health that are best placed to address risk factors for violence. This suggests that donors could do much more to orient their strategies and programming to help communities and countries in their efforts to tackle the challenge of armed violence.

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